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David Batho

With regards to moral relativism, this seems to be the principle at work: one culture has no basis for moral authority as there is no position from which one could look down on moralities and measure them against each other.  Thus we have no right to denounce other moral positions as Wrong (with a capital ‘w’).  The relativist speaks of toleration of other moralities from the view that what’s right for us may not be what’s right for them and so suggests we have no right of moral imposition.  A position which attempts to argue against moral relativism may seem, eo ipso, to argue against toleration.  Hence liberalism is seemingly set up against an anti-relativistic approach to morality.

Here, however, is an argument which suggests that the notion of toleration is not torn to shreds by an abandonment of moral relativism.  I would like to argue that moral liberalism requires a neutrality, from one’s own perspective, towards acts that are abhorrent.  This required neutrality, if adhered to, pours water on embers that should, if one is a moral person, be kept hot.  The reason I feel that this does not run counter to liberalism is that liberalism has mechanisms (namely, democracy) that encourage and allow for expression of moral fervour of which there is sadly no real equivalent in inter-national relations.

I

First I would like to frame my discussion of morality by pointing to a parallel in theory regarding the development of truth.  To claim that there is more than a resemblance between moral theory and ‘truth’ would be, I think, to suggest that moral statements are truth bearing.  This is not an indulgence I will allow myself to make.  Thus the comparison I make here between semantic anti-realism and the development of moral values is only metaphorical.

In short, semantic anti-realists à la Dummett suggest that the truth status of a given proposition is dependent upon the criteria implicit in language that ‘define’ what counts as a true statement and, correspondingly, what counts as false.  As culture develops, so does language.  In this way the criteria for truth change and accordingly a sense of which statements are countable as true also changes.  So the idea is that one can quite legitimately say without contradiction that ‘P is true’ and ‘P was false’.  The difference lies in the tense of the proposition (Dummett 1973: 63-8). Likewise, it seems, with morality.  What is morally questionable now was not open to such questioning in the past.  For example, 15 years ago it would perhaps have seemed odd to call the owner of a large 4×4 immoral.  Now (questions of justifiability aside) such an accusation is at least comprehensible.  The conditions (or implicit criteria) that ‘determine’ the moral status of a given act have developed, with culture, and so it seems plausible to say that it is no contradiction to place the statement ‘4×4s are immoral’ alongside that of ‘4×4s weren’t immoral’.

Now, the point of the semantic anti-realists is that it is from a mistaken conception of what one means by ‘true’ that one could grant the ‘truth’ of statements in another language which, by that language’s criteria, are deemed true but by our language’s criteria are false.  For example, Socrates may well say that “the sky is bronze” is a true statement, but it would be mistaken for us to agree with this on the basis of our understanding of bronze, etc.  Similarly, mightn’t it be the case that one would be misunderstanding the requirements of morality to affirm that which, from the confines of one’s own morality, one ought fervently to deny?  If morality is dependent on culture as truth is dependent upon language, to treat a moral position from another culture, which seems (from one’s own moral perspective) abhorrent, neutrally is to act somewhat hypocritically.  In the terms of semantic anti-realism, moral relativism asks us to affirm that which we should deny.  Moral relativism thus seems a morally untenable position to hold.

II

The worry at this point is that the argument might morph into a polemic against liberalism.  Doesn’t this argument imply that toleration is an immoral position to hold and, as such, that liberalism – with its respect for such toleration – is, in some sense, immoral?  Simply, no.  The difference between the two situations is the difference between the tools available to express moral fervour.  Liberalism requires a toleration a moral opponent’s existence but does not require neutrality toward one’s opponent’s position.  Because of a democratic government supposedly guaranteeing the peaceful, yet permissibly heated, discussion between two opposing parties, neither party may come to blows.  Morality doesn’t, in a system of democratic government, require the lopping off of the other’s head in order to make one’s point.

Different cultures currently exist outside of such a democratic government.  They may themselves be internally governed democratically, but there is no system above them that guarantees the peaceful yet heated expression of each person’s moral beliefs.  The U.N., idealized, is such a government.  But the U.N. is not as powerful as it needs to be in order to prohibit, in any meaningful sense, harmful conflict between two parties.  Morality, I believe, requires an expression of fervour.  As no government exists over and above competing cultures, fervour cannot be expressed democratically.  For me, this leaves two conclusions: a) that while no overarching government exists, intervention is (in some cases) a moral requirement ; and b) the U.N. is a worthwhile ideal to work towards to safeguard competing parties from unjustified interventions.

To conclude, a repudiation of moral relativism does not necessarily denote an illiberal political attitude.  As moral relativism has been rejected for its required immoral neutrality, and as this is not something that liberalism requires, the anti-relativistic attitude is compatible with liberal beliefs.

David Batho is a second year philosophy undergraduate at the University of Essex.

References
Dummett, M. 1973: ‘Truth’.  In P.F. Strawson (ed.): Philosophical Logic.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.